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BOOK REVIEW
FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH. By Helen Shirley Thomas.
Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960. Pp. 381. ($6.50)

FELIx

In a letter to Mr. Justice Holmes, Sir Frederic Pollock wrote: "It is
pleasing to see that the learned Felix Frankfurter has written in your
praise in the Harvard Law Review warmly but without being fulsome or
tedious."' Two decades have since gone by and he who bestowed the praise
is himself the recipient of a scholarly tribute that is warm and neither
fulsome nor tedious.
The author, a member of the faculty of Goucher College, has not
essayed a full-length biography of Justice Frankfurter, but, instead, has
attempted an analysis of his legal philosophy as gleaned from his writings,
judicial and extra-judicial.
The winds of controversy have swirled about the head of Justice Frankfurter for many years and it is inevitable that any book written about
him by one not hostile to his views of the judicial function, would be
somewhat of an apologia. Perhaps the greater portion of the criticism
that has been directed at the Justice springs from the disappointment of
those of liberal persuasion who had imagined that he would espouse their
views when he was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt. 2 The author correctly points out that this expectation had
very little basis in fact; that "His philosophy precludes adoption of whole'3
sale changes in the law.
After a brief biographical sketch, the author discusses the Justice's
opinions with occasional illumination derived from his other writings. Although her admiration for Justice Frankfurter is apparent all through the
book, she does not hesitate to offer criticism where she thinks it necessary,
nor does she fail to quote sources definitely opposed to the Justice's philosophy.
Under the heading of Symbolism and Social Unity, Frankfurter's
emphasis on symbolism as a factor in the transmission of the continuing
values of a civilization is disclosed and advanced as an explanation of his
opinions in the Flag Salute Cases.4 His belief in the symbolic role of the
1. 2

HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS

213 (Howe ed. 1941).

2. For an unexpected view of the Justice's sentimentality and impish humor, read
his own account of his appointment and how Senator Pat McCarran, a virulent opponent

subsequently came to him for a favor. FELIX FRANKFURTER, REMINISCENCES 283, 287
(1960).
3. P. 39 of the book reviewed herein.
4. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-671 (1943)
(dissent); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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Court as a protector of social interests and therefore not to be burdened
with trivia is said to underly his opposition to the granting of certiorari in
cases involving the Federal Employers Liability Act.
The difference within the Court as to the extent of the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment is treated under the
heading, The Uses of History. Although Frankfurter has referred to natural
law as "not much more than a literary garniture" and "Not a guiding means
for adjudication," 5 his insistence that only those "rights implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" be granted the sanctity of incorporation in the
Fourteenth Amendment is a fair example of natural law thinking. The
author suggests that this and other contradictions are the consequences
of Frankfurter's use of history as a means of determining societal and
personal values and his frontiers of legal thought. This position of extreme
vulnerability is little more than a groping explanation for the phenomenon
of inconsistency which seems to be one of the occupational hazards of
judging.
In her discussion of Dennis v. United States,6 the author quotes John
7
P. Frank's devastating comment on Frankfurter's concurring opinion.
Whether or not the Communist threat provided sufficient justification for
the contraction of the permissible area of freedom of speech will long be
debated. That the Court itself entertained doubts is apparent from its
holding in Yates v. United States,8 which modified the Dennis doctrine
by requiring incitement rather than mere advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the government to constitute a crime under the Smith Act. Surprisingly, the Yates case is not discussed in the book.
Many pages are devoted to an exegis of the "preferred-position" controversy between the advocates of judicial self-restraint on the Court led
by Justice Frankfurter, and the "libertarian-activist" approach championed
by Justices Black and Douglas. The so-called libertarian-activities would, in
effect, erect a presumption of unconstitutionality with regard to legislation
purporting to abridge the civil liberties embraced in the Bill of Rights.9
The view of Justice Frankfurter and his followers is that faith must be
placed in the legislature and not in the judiciary to work out the accommodations between liberty and order. 10
5.

FRANKFURTER,

JOHN MARSHALL

6..341 U.S. 494 (1951).

IN GOVERNMENT UNDER

LAw

15, 16 (1956).

7. "This opinion is the very epitome of intellectual liberalism at its most ineffective." Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 165,
187 (1952).

8. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

9. See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865 (1960) and for a recital
of the attempts to constitutionally limit the Court, see Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals
in Congress, 33 NOTRE DAME LAw. 597 (1958).
10. It would give one small comfort to be deprived of civil rights in the interests
of a concept called "judicial self restraint." One is reminded of Baron Surrebutter
explaining to client Crogate that he had lost the case but had thereby vindicated the
rules of special pleading. See Hayes, Crogate's Case, 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENCLIsH LAW 417 (1926).
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One of the best parts of the book is the chapter headed "The Man
Who Talks So Much," which relates various aspects of the judicial function,
such as the writing of opinions and the behavior of the Justice during oral
argument. His sharp interrogation of counsel and his insistence on the
regularity of procedure are reminiscent of the dramatis personae of the
Year Books such as Judges Bereford, Stonore, Hervey, et al., whose verbal
exchanges with counsel over the metaphysics of procedure were sometimes
more amusing than enlightening.
Perhaps because the author is not formally trained in the law, discussion of the Justice's opinions in various highly technical legal fields have
been omitted. In these, whether writing for the majority or dissenting, the
Justice has seemed more often than not to have given the correct decision.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with his judicial views, however, it would
be unfair to deny that he has proven worthy of the appellation "Scholar
on the Bench." One puts down this book with the feeling that a greater
understanding has been obtained of one of the most brilliant and complex
personalities of our time.
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